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Barr: Contributory Negligence in Warranty Law

NOTES
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN WARRANTY LAW
The emergence of the warranty action from its accustomed commercial-contractual environment of sales law into the rapidly expanding area of "products liability" is one of the major current developments in the common law. This phenomenon is one of the most
voluminously discussed subjects in recent legal literature. It is a
matter of intense controversy between plaintiffs' and defendants' bars,
and it has inspired comment by spokesmen for the broad groups most
directly affected as principals - the business community' and con2
sumers.
Traditionally, the concept of privity of contract has been the
primary defense against use of the warranty action. The requirement of privity, or direct contractual dealing between plaintiff and
defendant, restricted the action to buyers suing their immediate
sellers. Within the structure of modern marketing and distribution,
the practical effect of privity has been to exclude manufacturers and
intermediate distributors as defendants and non-purchasing consumers as plaintiffs. In a sense, the recent tendency of many courts
to reject or circumvent the privity requirement explains both the
escape of warranty from its traditional sales law context and its increased use by plaintiffs' counsel.
The persisting strength of privity, especially in non-food cases, is
not to be underestimated. 3 But the assault upon privity proceeds; and
although it is too early for its defenders to abandon the position, it is
not premature to reconnoiter secondary lines of resistance. This note
investigates the effect of the plaintiff's misconduct upon his success in
a warranty action; particular attention is given to the possible availability of contributory negligence as an affirmative defense.
Warranty is an area in which an investigator does well to proceed
with caution. The mass of sales-law distinctions and high technicality
surrounding the action exhibits many signs of stress and appears to be
at a stage at which it can neither be safely relied upon nor ignored.
The law in this area is in a state of change; important social and
economic interests are at stake; and consistency of theory yields at
many points to the overriding impulse of social policy.4 The doctrinal
1. Keatley, Products on Trial, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 31, 1960, p. 1,
Col. 1.
2. 27 CONsu~iER REPORTS 5 (1962).
3. For an extensive review of the status of privity, see Prosser, The Assault
upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
4. "The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon
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and semantic uncertainty that affects warranty law is especially evident
in cases dealing with the problem of plaintiff misconduct. In their
search for precedents, both plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel will
find themselves forced to fish in muddy waters.
THE POLICY ISSUE

Warranty law imposes a type of strict liability on the supplier
of corn flakes similar to that imposed on keepers of dangerous animals and on persons engaging in ultrahazardous activities, such as
blasting operations. That is, the question of the defendant's negligence, in the sense of unreasonable conduct, is technically irrelevant
in warranty. 5 When the plaintiff establishes that the defendant warranted against a defect or dangerous characteristic that the product
nonetheless exhibited, that the plaintiff was damaged, and that the
defect was attributable to the defendant and was factually and legally
the cause of the damage, the defendant may be held liable despite
his total lack of fault in the sense of negligent conduct or wrongful
intent.,
The strict liability of warranty is similar to that normally incurred by a contracting party, since a contract breach need not be
negligent or intentional to result in liability. But there is this
difference: The ordinary contracting party defines the terms of his
own undertaking and thus limits his potential liability. In warranty,
the law may define the supplier's undertaking and corresponding
liability. The bulk of recent actions involve warranties of merchantability and fitness, which are implied in law regardless of the factual
intent and conduct of the supplier. In other words, implied warranty
law contemplates that the supplier assumes his responsibilities not
by making express promises but by merely engaging in the business
of selling goods.
the intricacies of the law of sales .... [Elvery consideration of law and public
policy requires that the consumer should have a remedy. If there are no authorities which grant one it is high time for such an authority." Ketterer '.
Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
5. See, e.g., Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958);
Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957):
Lohse v. Coffey, 32 A.2d 258 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1943).
6. The strict liability of warranty is admittedly difficult to distinguish from
the liability that may be imposed in a negligence action in which the plaintiff
successfully invokes the concept of res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa, like warranty, relieves the plaintiff from his sometimes insurmountable difficulty of probing within
the defendant's establishment for evidence of negligent conduct. A plaintiff relying on res ipsa in a negligence action, however, may experience acute distress
when the defendant presents his unending actual proof of due care to judge and
jury. For the views of one plaintiff's counsel, see Asbe, So You're Going to TYN
a Products Liability Case, 13 HAsrI-xes L. J. 66 (1961).
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Underlying the expanded use of the warranty action is the stereotype of the helpless consumer in today's marketing system. Manipulated by the hard sell, the soft sell, and the subliminal sell, and dependent for the necessities of life upon remote manufacturers and
distributors, the modern consumer at the automatic vending machine
presents a picture in sharp contrast to negligence law's image of the
self-reliant individual. If the conception of the manipulated consumer is accepted, justice appears to require that the legal responsibility of the manipulating supplier be increased7
The matter of plaintiff misconduct, however, adds a clashing hue
to the picture of the helpless consumer. Just how much responsibility
is to be shifted to the supplier? Is the consumer-plaintiff to become a
sacred cow - everyone's responsibility but his own? Or does the
consumer have a responsibility to protect himself? If so, how is this
responsibility to be defined and related to the supplier's strict
liability in warranty?s The growth of warranty represents a dissatisfaction with negligence law's "reasonable man" definition of supplier
duty. The problem presented by plaintiff misconduct is whether
the "reasonable man" test provides a proper measure of consumer
self-protective responsibility. The courts are in some doubt.
PLAINTIFF MISCONDUCT

Effect on the Issue of Breach of Warranty
It is important to recognize that the problem of plaintiff misconduct may be raised and resolved in a warranty action without resort to the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. The plaintiff may find that his own misconduct, quite apart from any affirmative defense, brings unsuspected difficulties into his task of proving the
7. Concern for the welfare of the consumer is not limited to the courts. On
Mar. 16, 1962, in proposing to Congress an extensive executive and legislative program for consumer protection, President Kennedy stated in part: "Many of the
new products used every day in the home are highly complex. The housewife is
called upon to be an amateur electrician, mechanic, chemist, toxicologist, dietitian
and mathematician- but she is rarely furnished the information she needs to perform these tasks proficiently.
"Marketing is increasingly impersonal. Consumer choice is influenced by mass
advertising utilizing highly developed arts of persuasion. The consumer typically
cannot know whether drug preparations meet minimum standards of safety, quality
and efficacy. He usually does not know... whether the performance of a product
will in fact meet his needs .... " N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1962, p. 16, col. 2.
8. Professor Plant has defined the issue as follows: "If negligence on the part
of defendant is not required to establish liability, it is only logical to conclude
that contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff is irrelevant. This is the
way the law has shaped itself in most other areas where strict liability prevails.
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elements of a breach of warranty. Or, although a breach of warranty
is established, the defendant may prevent substantial recovery by
raising the matter of plaintiff's fault as an issue of damage mitigation.
The effect of plaintiff misconduct on the issue of breach of warranty
will be considered initially.
Proof of Defect and Causation. The plaintiff's burden of proof
in warranty is not met unless he shows, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the product contained a defect attributable to the defendant and that the defect was the proximate cause of his damage.
It is not enough to show that he used the product and later suffered
an injury. Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith 9 demonstrates how a plaintiff's
possible misconduct becomes entangled in the question whether there
was any breach of warranty. The plaintiff had purchased a large corn
storage bin designed to preserve fresh, undried corn by accumulating
a supply of carbon dioxide to retard bacterial action. The bin had
to be thoroughly sealed to operate properly. The plaintiff, however,
installed and operated his own discharge equipment at the base of
the bin. When the corn spoiled he brought a warranty action,
claiming that the bin was defective. The defendant prevailed because
of a disclaimer in the sales contract, but the court also indicated that
the plaintiff failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the loss was caused by a faulty bin rather than his own faulty
installation and operation of the discharge machinery. In other words,
the plaintiff failed to prove a breach of warranty. Although the court
denied that the principle of contributory negligence is involved in a
warranty action, it felt that the buyer's conduct was "connected with
the matter of proximate cause and direct and natural result."'1
Courts are aware that in the usual warranty case the product
is in the plaintiff's exclusive control and that, in obtaining evidence
of the plaintiff's misconduct, the defendant consequently encounters
difficulties comparable to those confronting the plaintiff in proving
the defendant's fault in a negligence action. Courts are also aware
of the possibility of fraudulent claims. Accordingly, although in
theory the plaintiff's burden is merely to prove a breach of warranty,
in fact it may include the task of virtually disproving his own misconduct. The court in Rasmus implied as much in observing that
The interesting prospect thus opened up is that of a negligent user of a manufactured product successfully suing the non-negligent manufacturer thereof for an
injury arising in part out of a defect which by pure accident (and not through
any fault of the manufacturer) happened to be present in the product ....
"
Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-

An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 950 (1957).
9. 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958).
10. Id. at 95.
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"the question as to whether it was a faulty machine and the question
as to whether it was faultily operated by the buyer are inextricably
entwined."',
In Landers v. Safeway Stores12 the court was more explicit. The
plaintiff claimed that household bleach purchased from the defendant
had injured his hands after use according to the directions on the
3
bottle. The court stated::
"Proof that plaintiff 'used [the bleach] according to instructions
and thereafter suffered harm is not sufficient to prove a breach
of warranty under the peculiar circumstances of this case, unless he should prove further that he did not also use it in
violation of instructions."
The "peculiar circumstances" of the case appear to have been the
plaintiff's failure to convince the court that another product, or his
possible unacknowledged use of the bleach at full strength, contrary
to directions, had caused his injury. The court added: "We are not
concerned with contributory negligence, but rather with the requirement of logical proof of an issue as to which plaintiff has the bur14
den."
Other courts have reached similar results with less theoretical
precision. In E. B. ConstantineMfg. Co. v. Reynolds's the plaintiff
complained that his mechanical fish failed to operate properly after
little boys in his employ threw them into the water without winding
their motors or inserting their plugs to keep them afloat. The court
concluded that "if because of his [plaintiff's] neglect the fish sank
11.

Ibid.

12. 172 Ore. 116, 139 P.2d 788 (1943).
13. Id. at 138, 189 P.2d at 796. (Emphasis added.)
14. Ibid. "Logical proof" may be a somewhat different affair when plaintiff's
misconduct does not enter the picture. In Lohse v. Coffey, 32 A.2d 258 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App.), plaintiff claimed that he had suffered an attack of acute gastro-intestinal
disturbance as the result of eating contaminated cream pie in defendant's restaurant.
Plaintiff failed to produce any direct evidence that the pie was in fact contaminated.
The court said: "Plaintiff proved the purchase and consumption of the food and
that illness followed. He also proved that another person who consumed the same
foods at the same time (though with a different beverage) also became ill. He
did not prove by direct testimony that... if there was unwholesomeness in the
food it was a competent producing cause of the injury." Id. at 260. (Emphasis
added.) Concluding that this was sufficient proof to take the case to the jury, the
court further observed: "Only the most litigious plaintiff would have had the
presence of mind in the throes of intermittent attacks of vomiting and diarrhea
to arrange for laboratory tests and chemical analysis of his vomitus and excreta
to be brought into court to prove his case. A man can hardly be expected to
prepare a lawsuit while writhing on an ambulance stretcher or a hospital bed."
Id.at 261.
15. 123 App. Div. 555, 108 N.Y. Supp. 36 (2d Dep't 1908).
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to the bottom and refused to do their work he cannot claim a breach
of warranty."16
Occasionally the factual possibility that a faulty product may
be negligently operated appears to be denied. Jury instructions may
then be framed to require selection of "the cause" of the damage, excluding the possibility that both plaintiff and defendant contributed
to the harm.'7 In any event, it is possible to decide the case on a basis
that accounts for plaintiff's misconduct, without the help of contributory negligence as an affirmative defense.
Scope of the Warranty. Judicious definition of the supplier's
warranty may also resolve the problem of plaintiff misconduct.
The defendant may be pleased to learn, for example, that his warranty did not contemplate misuse, negligent use, or mismanagement of
the product. The following type of proviso in the definition of warranty is not uncommon:' 8
"[A] warranty of quality or fitness for a purpose contemplates
reasonably good management in the use of the article by persons of ordinary skill and experience, and the warranty is not
broken where the failure of the article to give satisfaction is
due to mismanagement of the purchaser."
The trichinosis cases bring the problem of consumer self-protective
responsibility sharply into focus. A defendant can produce impressive evidence that trichina parasites cannot be detected in raw pork
by any commercially feasible means, thus emphasizing his own lack
of fault. 9 Moreover, a plaintiff cannot deny that the parasites are
instantly killed by subjection to heat of 137 degrees Fahrenheit. The
issue cannot be resolved in terms of causation; it is idle to inquire
whether the parasites or lack of adequate cooking caused the disease.
16.
17.

Id. at 557, 108 N.Y. Supp. at 37.
See, e.g., Wilmington Candy Co. v. Remington Mach. Co., 21 Del. 543, 65

Atl. 74 (1906).
18. Halstead v. American Magnestone Corp., 84 Ind. App. 205, 207, 149 N.E.
698, 699 (1925). The ambiguity of the quoted language should be noted. Is this
a matter of the scope of the warranty, or of causation, or both?
19. See Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 87 N.E.2d 30 (1949).
for an extensive discussion of technical authorities. The extreme difficulty of
detecting trichina parasites by inspection should not be confused with the question
of their possible prevention. A Baltimore City Health Department inspector has
testified: "There are generally five ways to prevent trichinosis. The first one is
to stop feeding garbage to hogs. The second is to cook the garbage. The third
is to refrigerate all the pigs for a long period of time at a very cold temperature,
about five degrees, for about twenty-one days. The fourth is, of course, to cook
all pork products thoroughly, which every housewife should do. And the fifth
is by an antigen test, which isn't such a good way." Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181
Md. 614, 620, 31 A.2d 316, 319 (1943).
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The problem is frequently dealt with by qualifying tie scope
of the warranty. Courts recognize the teaching of common experience:
"Fresh pork is not ordinarily intended to be eaten raw."20 The
seller thus warrants that the meat is fit for human consumption after
proper cooking2l or after ordinaiy domestic cooking 22 Where proper
cooking is the accepted measure of consumer self-protective responsibility, a court strongly motivated to extricate a defendant from his
seeming dilemma may take judicial notice of the "factual impossibility" of contracting the disease after proper cooking.2 3 The radical
effect is to bar trichinosis plaintiffs generally as a matter of law.
More often, however, the jury is permitted to determine whether
the plaintiff's preparations constituted "proper" or "ordinary domestic" cooking, thus making the scope of the warranty a question of
4
fact. As stated in the leading case of Holt v. Mann:2
"It is true, according to the evidence, that trichinae are killed
by exposure to heat of one hundred thirty-seven degrees Fahrenheit. But in ordinary household cooking it is not easy to be
sure that every part of a ham will be heated to so high a degree.
It could have been found that the ham was cooked as thoroughly
as could be expected in a family, but without killing the trichinae with which it was infested."
It might well be concluded that warranty liability ends where
plaintiffs' negligence begins. The case results indicate, however, that
the standard of conduct implied in warranty is more subjective than
the objective "due care" of negligence law. Thus, a housewife who
"knew nothing about... trichinae" 25 may recover, but a doctor 26 or a
chef of twenty-five years' experience2- may not.
Avoidable Consequences
Although a plaintiff establishes a breach of warranty, the defendant may show that continued use of the product after discovery of
its defective or dangerous nature resulted in a portion of the injuries.
20. Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 697, 255 N.W. 414, 416 (1934).
21. See, e.g., Feinstein v. Daniel Reeves, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1936);
Nicketta v. National Tea Co., supra note 19; Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, supra note 19.
22. See, e.g., Holt v. Mann, 294 Mass. 21, 200 N.E. 403 (1936), and cases
cited therein.
23. Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 87 N.E.2d 30 (1949).
24. 294 Mass. 21, 24, 200 N.E. 403, 405 (1936). The plaintiff "boiled [the
ham] for three hours or more, and then baked [it] for an hour, in accordance
It appeared well
with approved directions . . . in a well-known cook book ....
cooked." Id. at 22, 200 N.E. at 404.
25. McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 134, 2 N.E.2d 513, 514 (1936).
26. Silverman v. Swift 9, Co., 141 Conn. 450, 107 A.2d 277 (1954).
27. Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., 281 N.Y. 474, 24 N.E.2d 131 (1939).
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By application of the doctrine of avoidable consequences, 2 a plaintiff is denied recovery for any damages incurred subsequent to his
discovery of the defect if these could reasonably have been avoided.2 9
He may not claim further reliance on the warranty, and later "experiments" with the product will be at his own risk.
Although the line between the concept of contributory negligence
and the doctrine of avoidable consequences is admittedly obscure,
certain basic distinctions exist. The burden of proof under each
theory is on the defendant - either to show that the plaintiff was negligent or to show that he unreasonably incurred avoidable and unnecessary damages. Contributory negligence, however, is an affirmative
defense that the defendant must plead, while avoidable consequences
is a matter of damage mitigation that need not be pleaded. Perhaps
the most important difference is that contributory negligence is a
complete defense that destroys liability and totally bars recovery,
whereas application of the avoidable consequences rule only reduces
the amount of recoverable damages without affecting the ultimate
issue of liability.30
Numerous cases recognize that although the plaintiff may not recover damages sustained after discovery of the defect, he nevertheless
retains the right to recover (1) general damages, defined as the difference between the value of the product as sold and the value as
warranted,31 and (2) those special or consequential damages sustained
prior to discovery of the defect.32 When the plaintiff's right to recover these earlier damage elements is acknowledged, there is little
doubt that his failure to recover damages sustained after discovery
of the defect is a matter of avoidable consequences and not contributory negligence.
28.

For a discussion of the avoidable consequences doctrine, see McCoRMICK,
127-58 (1935). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS §336 (1932); RESrATE-

DAMAGES

ToRTs §918 (1939).
29. E.g., Hitchcock v. Hunt, 28 Conn. 343 (1859); Cedar Rapids & Iowa City
Ry. & L. Co. v. Sprague Elec. Co., 203 Ill. App. 424 (1917); Swift v. Redhead, 147
Iowa 94, 122 N.W. 140 (1909); Northern Supply Co. v. Wangard, 123 Wis. 1, 100
N.W. 1066 (1904).
30. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 128-30 (1935). McCormick draws the further distinction that contributory negligence consists of plaintiff's negligence occurring
before defendant's wrongdoing is completed, while avoidable consequences contemplates plaintiff's negligence after defendant has committed an actionable wrong.
In warranty it would seem that the defendant's wrong in this sense is generally
complete at the time of sale.
31. E.g., Daley v. Irwin, 56 Cal. App. 325, 205 Pac. 76 (1922). Or the plainMENT,

tiff may be awarded nominal damages. Swift v. Redhead, supra note 29; Major v.

Hefley-Coleman Co., 164 S.W. 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
32. E.g., Rice v. Friend Bros. Co., 179 Iowa 355, 161 N.W. 310 (1917); Finks
v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 235 Mo. App. 679, 147 S.W.2d 124 (1941); Pinney v.
Andrus, 41 Vt. 631 (1869); cf. Foote v. Woodworth, 66 Vt. 216, 28 AtI. 1034 (1894),
in which the jury was permitted to apportion the damages.
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In other "discovered defect" cases, however, the plaintiff's right
to recover these earlier damage elements is not mentioned.3 3 This
often happens because the court has denied a breach of warranty on
another ground, 34 or because general damages are insignificant compared to the special damages claimed. For example, when the plaintiff sustains serious personal injury from an exploding pop bottle,
little attention is given to his arguable right to recover the difference
between the value of the bottle as warranted and as sold.3 5 Moreover, he may find it difficult, as a matter of proof, to separate those
elements of special damage sustained prior to his discovery of the
defect from those sustained afterwards. For example, in Finks v.
Viking Refrigerators, Inc.3 6 defendant sold plaintiff a refrigerator
showcase that failed to operate properly. Meat placed in the showcase spoiled, and the plaintiff claimed special damages for the spoilage and lost profits. The court acknowledged his technical right to
recover for spoilage and lost profits sustained prior to his discovery
that the showcase was defective, but the plaintiff was unable to show
how much spoilage had occurred before discovery of the defect; his
claim for these damages, therefore, failed for uncertainty and want
of sufficient proof.
A few cases appear to hold broadly that plaintiff's negligence bars
recovery of all consequential damages.3 7 These cases appear to set
forth a rule closely akin to the concept of contributory negligence.
But a leading case in this group 38 explicitly recognizes that the plaintiff's negligence does not affect his right to recover general damages,
thus indicating that these cases are more properly interpreted as overstated applications of the doctrine of avoidable consequences. The
right to recover general damages is incompatible with a distinguishing
33. E.g., Allen v. Tompkins, 136 N.C. 208, 48 S.E. 655 (1904); Pauls Valley
Milling Co. v. Gabbert, 182 Okla. 500, 78 P.2d 685 (1938); Northern Supply Co.
v. Wangard, 123 Wis. 1, 100 N.W. 1066 (1904).
34. E.g., Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964
(1950).
35. Cf. Natale v. Pepsi Cola Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 282, 182 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1st
Dep't 1959), an exploding pop bottle case in which judgment on plaintiff's
$200,000 jury verdict was reversed. The accident occurred when the infant plaintiff attempted to open the bottle on the hasp of a school gate. The rationale of
the case is not entirely dear, but the critical point appears to be plaintiff's failure
to establish the causation element of the alleged breach of warranty.
36. 235 Mo. App. 679, 147 S.W.2d 124 (1941).
37. Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955); Razey v. J. B.
Colt Co., infra note 38; Bruce v. Fiss, Doerr & Carroll Horse Co., 47 App. Div.
273, 62 N.Y. Supp. 96 (2d Dep't 1900); cf. Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., 281 N.Y.
474, 24 N.E.2d 131 (1939); Ellen v. Heacock, 247 App. Div. 476, 286 N.Y. Supp. 740
(4th Dep't 1936).
38. Razey v. J. B. Colt Co., 106 App. Div. 103, 94 N.Y. Supp. 59 (2d Dep't 1905).
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characteristic of contributory negligence - the total destruction of liability. In any event, the broad doctrine of these cases does not improve the usual concept of avoidable consequences. Although in
most instances the plaintiff will probably fail to identify those consequential damages sustained prior to his discovery of the defect, he
should be permitted to do so whenever possible. It is eminently fair
to deny the plaintiff the right to enhance his damages after discovery
of the defect and place responsibility upon the supplier under cover
of the warranty. But it seems both unfair and illogical to attribute
the plaintiff's earlier injuries to his later negligence. If the earlier injuries were fairly attributable to the breach of warranty at the time
they were incurred, it is difficult to conceive how the supplier's responsibility for these injuries is extinguished by the plaintiff's subsequent conduct with the product.
Contributory Negligence
Close inspection of warranty cases in which contributory negligence
superficially appears to function as an affirmative defense usually reveals that the court is in fact refusing to find a breach of warranty
or is applying some form of the rule of avoidable consequences. In
other opinions the language is so enigmatic that no definite explanation can be given. No warranty case has been found in which the
court acknowledges a breach of warranty but clearly denies the defendant's liability by sustaining contributory negligence as an affirmative defense. 39 The dictum in Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co.4 that "contributory negligence may be asserted as a defense
to the breach of warranty action" is not based on convincing authority.41 Fredendallv. A braham & Straus,42 cited in Parish to support
the quoted proposition, bears mention. The plaintiff became ill after
using dry cleaning fluid in a small, unventilated room contrary to
directions on the container. In a cryptically short opinion the court
43
concluded:
39. But see Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 58, 102 N.E.2d
289 (C.P. 1951), in which the primary issue before the court was the lack of privity
between plaintiff's deceased and the defendant supplier. The court stated that
"in the absence of contributory negligence such workman could recover on the
basis of a breach of warranty against the party who sold the wheel to his employer." Id. at 64, 102 N.E.2d at 293. In Arnaud's Restaurant, Inc. v. Cotter, 212
F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955), the court, applying
Louisiana law, refused to find contributory negligence as a matter of law but
indicated that the matter was a proper question for the jury, thus impliedly accepting the use of the defense in warranty.
40. 13 Misc. 2d 33, 46, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 21 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958).
41. Only 2 of the 13 cases cited in support are clearly warranty cases.
42. 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d 11 (1938).
43. Id. at 148, 18 N.E.2d at 11.
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"We think the evidence conclusively shows that the plaintiff
failed to use reasonable care in the use of the fluid and that this
default was an essential cause of her illness. We do not pass
upon any other question."
This language might be interpreted as an application of the concept
of contributory negligence. It may just as easily be interpreted, however, as a finding that the warranty was not breached.
Although no case has unambiguously accepted the use of contributory negligence as an affirmative defense in warranty, several cases have
clearly denied the defense. 44 At least one court, moreover, has sustained the defense in a negligence count while rejecting it in a warranty count in the same case. 45 There are several reasons underlying
the courts' rejection of contributory negligence in warranty actions.
In part it is a matter of distaste for the interjection of a tort concept
into an action viewed as one in contract. 46 In part it may be an expression of general dissatisfaction with the defense and an unwillingness to extend its field of operation.47 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, however, that some role is also played by the same motivations and conceptions of social policy that in recent years have been
reshaping warranty as a device for increasing consumer protection.
Perhaps the courts feel that contributory negligence is too blunt and
undiscriminating an instrument to be of service in their delicate
operation of redefining and reaccommodating supplier duties and
consumer self-protective responsibilities. The courts appear to be
unwilling to deny all relief to every negligent buyer and consumer.
Justifiable Negligence
Warranty is not a consumer's license to be negligent. The plaintiff whose handling of the product noticeably deviates from the norm
44. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960);
Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957);
Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933); Friend v. Childs Dining Hall
Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918); Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290

Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., infra note 45;
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959); Vaningan v.
Mueller, 208 Wis. 527, 243 N.W. 419 (1932); cf. Young v. Aeroil Prod. Co., 248
F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957); Sapiente v. Waltuch, 127 Conn. 224, 15 A.2d 417 (1940);

Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
45. Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E.2d 668 (1941).
46. This explanation is given in Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., supra note

44; Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 44; Vaningan v. Mueller, supra note 44.
47. For a critical discussion of contributory negligence, see PROSSER, SE.ECTED
ToPicS IN THE LAW OF ToRTs 1 (1953). See also Leflar, The Declining Defense of
Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1946).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

11

UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW
Florida LawOF
Review,
Vol. 15, Iss.
1 [1962],
Art. 4

of "due care" cannot expect the court to overlook this fact. The plaintiff whose negligence clearly constitutes misuse of the product or
voluntary assumption of the risk of known defects is in most cases
probably ill advised to litigate at all. The courts' rejection of contributory negligence in warranty provides little hope of recovery in
such cases; they have adequate means, in terms of appropriately
tailored definitions of warranty, adjustable proof requirements, and
the flexible concepts of proximate causation and avoidable consequences, to shield the defendant's pocketbook from the undeserving
plaintiff.
Nonetheless, there appears to be a range of plaintiff misconduct
that, while predictably constituting contributory negligence in a negligence action, may not bar recovery in warranty. Several cases demonstrate that defendant's charge of plaintiff's fault, when predicated
solely on plaintiff's failure to discover product defects, may not meet
with judicial approval. Negligent failure to discover product defects,
in other words, may in some instances be condoned. In Boston
Woven-Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall 8s the plaintiff sued in warranty to recover money he had paid his employees as the result of
personal injuries they sustained when a boiler purchased from the
defendant exploded. To establish his case in warranty, the plaintiff
was obliged to show that the payments to his employees were made
under a legal obligation rather than for business reasons; he had to
establish that he had been negligent vis-i-vis his employees. Justice
Holmes extricated the plaintiff from this dilemma with the following
49
analysis:
"The plaintiff's misconduct consisted in a failure to discover
by inspection a defect in an article specially made for it ....

Such a failure might make the plaintiff answerable to its men,
but even if its conduct be called want of ordinary care, it was
induced, as we must assume after the verdict, by the warranty
of representations of the defendants. The very purpose of the
warranty was that the boiler should be used in the plaintiff's
works with reliance upon the defendant's judgment in a matter
as to which the defendants were experts and the plaintiff
presumably was not."
The reliance idea underlying the concept of warranty is thus to some
extent incompatible with the idea of contributory negligence. By its
very nature, reliance on the warranty justifies some lack of the selfprotective prudence and caution demanded of the plaintiff in a negligence action.
48.

178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901).

49. Id. at 237, 59 N.E. at 657.
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NOTES
Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co.5o shows that tolerable plaintiff misconduct in warranty may be broader than failure to discover
defects. The plaintiff negligently overturned his car, which the
manufacturer had advertised as a "rugged fortress of safety." A
special feature was the car's seamless roof, but when the car overturned the plaintiff cut the top of his head on a jagged weld seam
in the car roof. The court held the manufacturer liable on its express warranty and rejected the defense of contributory negligence.
The plaintiff's negligence consisted in improper driving, not in failure to discover the weld seam.
It is instructive to compare the Bahiman case with Ringstad v. I.
Magnin & Co., 51 in which the plaintiff-housewife was injured when
her cocktail robe purchased from the defendant burst explosively
into flame upon coming into "casual" contact with her electric stove
while she was preparing dinner. The defendant did not expressly
raise the defense of contributory negligence; it relied upon the
J5 2
Fredendall
and Landers53 cases to support its contention that the
the robe improperly, offering the following suggestion:54
used
plaintiff
"The court can take judicial notice that a housewife cooking a
dinner generally wears a simple garment allowing ease in
operation or at least protects herself by an apron which will
prevent her dress coming into casual contact with the electric
burners."
The court's impatient reaction is instructive: 55
"We are taking no judicial notice as to what is generally worn
in a kitchen ....
In the present day, with modern household
appliances and other labor-saving devices, and with servants the
exception rather than the rule, the housewife frequently appears
in a dual capacity, performing household tasks while dressed for
other occasions."
There may be a common element in negligent automobile driving
and the arguable carelessness of wearing a loose cocktail robe in
the kitchen while preparing a meal. Perhaps they are both risks
"that may be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the
enterprise"56 of making and selling automobiles and cocktail robes.
50. 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 809 (1939).
51. 89 Wash. 2d 923, 289 P.2d 848 (1952).
52. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
54. 89 Wash. 2d at 933, 239 P.2d at 853.
55. Ibid.
56. James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 161, 175 (1954). See Wilson,
Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 809 (1955), for an extensive analysis of both
negligence and warranty liability in terms of "typicality of risk."
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